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We congratulate Berger and Delampady (B&D) on an informative paper. 
However we do not believe that the point null testing problem they have 
considered reflects the common usage of point null tests. Their main thesis is 
that the frequentist P-value overstates the evidence against the null hypothesis 
while the Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis is a more sensible 
measure. A second point of their paper is that point null hypotheses are 
reasonable approximations for some small interval nulls. We disagree with both of 
these points. 
The large posterior probability of H0 that B & D compute is a result of the 
large prior probability they assign to H0 , a prior probability that is much larger 
than is reasonable for most problems in which point null tests are used. And 
replacing a large prior probability for a point by an equally large prior probability 
for a small interval about the point does not remedy the problem. It only replaces 
one unrealistic problem with another. We will argue that given a reasonably small 
prior probability for an interval about the point null, the posterior probability and 
the P-value do not disagree. Before moving to the main points of our rejoinder, 
however, we would like to make a general comment. 
Contrary to what B&D would have us believe, a great many practitioners 
should not be testing point nulls, but should be setting up confidence intervals. 
Interval estimation is, in our opinion, superior to point null hypothesis testing, 
B&D Rejoinder 3 notwithstanding. However, we will not argue about the 
appropriateness of the test of a point null. Instead, we will argue the following: 
Given the common problems in which point null tests are used, the Bayesian 
measure of evidence, as exemplified by B & D's equation (4) is not a meaningful 
measure. In fact, it is not the case that P-values are too small, but rather that 
Bayes point null posterior probabilities are much too big! 
First we will discuss types of precise null hypotheses and suggest that the 
type considered by B & D is not common. Then we will make some comments 
regarding interval null hypotheses. 
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In Section 5, B & D describe two types of precise hypotheses. They point out 
that their results only apply to the second type. But they have ignored a third 
type, the type that describes the most common usage of point null tests. Consider 
the following three types; (1) and (2) were the two mentioned by B & D. 
1) Precise hypotheses that are just stated for convenience and have no 
special prior believability. 
2) Precise hypotheses that do correspond to a concentration of prior belief. 
3) Precise hypotheses that describe a unique, interesting feature of the 
population but that have no special prior believability. 
We will discuss each of these types. 
As an example of type (1), B & D seem to suggest a situation in which a one-
sided test is appropriate but a two-sided, point null test is used. Another example 
might be a one-sided problem in which H0 : e = 90 rather than the appropriate 
H0 :9~90 is used. (Casella & Berger(1987) point out that this convenient 
restatement creates a bias toward H0 in a Bayesian analysis.) In either case the 
hypotheses have not been properly formulated. Our concern should not be to 
analyze these misspecified problems but to educate the user so that the 
hypotheses are properly formulated. So although, as B&D admit, the P-value 
might be a reasonable measure of evidence in this type of problem, we should be 
more concerned with ensuring that these convenient hypotheses are not tested. 
Type (2) hypotheses are the type considered in B & D. In fact, in their tables 
(Tables 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8) in which P-values and P(H0 I x) are compared, 710 = ~ is 
used. Most researchers would not put a 50% prior probability on H0 • The purpose 
of an experiment is often to disprove H0 and researchers are not performing 
experiments that they believe, a priori, will fail half the time! We would be 
surprised if most researchers would place even a 10% prior probability on H0 • We 
hope that the casual reader of B & D realizes that the big discrepancies between 
P-values and P(H0 I x) that are reported in the tables are due to a large extent to 
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the large value of 71" 0 =~ that was used. Statements of B&D, such as "when testing 
precise hypotheses, formal use of P-values should be abandoned", must be qualified 
to apply only to type (2) hypotheses with unusually large values of 71"0 • 
We believe that most point null hypotheses that are tested are of type (3). 
If H0 were true, then the population would have some unique, interesting feature. 
But the researcher does not believe, a priori, that this feature exists and, in fact, 
probably expects to show that H0 is not true. The following two examples, we 
believe, encompass many point null tests that are done. In neither example is the 
researcher likely to believe that H0 is true. In the first example, e = /.}. 1 - IJ.z, the 
difference between two population means and H0 : e = 0 is tested with a paired-
difference or independent samples test. It would be a very interesting situation if 
/.}. 1 were to equal J.l.z but the researcher does not typically believe that this is even 
approximately true, much less exactly true. In the second example, H0 : (3i = 0 is 
tested where (3i is a regression coefficient. Again, it would be an important feature 
of the population if H0 were true. It would indicate that the independent variable 
xi has no effect on the response variable. But the researcher does not place a 
high prior probability on H0 • Indeed, xi probably would not have been included in 
the experiment if the researcher thought that it was highly likely that x, was 
unrelated to the response variable. We believe that these examples typify the 
common usages of point null tests and, as B & D admit in Section 5, P-values are 
reasonable measures of evidence when there is no apriori concentration of belief 
about H0 • 
Much of B&D's paper concerns testing an interval null, H0 :19-901 $ E:, rather 
than testing a point null. There are two points regarding interval nulls on which 
we would like to elaborate. These are 
a) The Bayesian test of a point null, with 71" 0 = ~, cannot be approximated by 
a test of an interval null hypothesis in problems unless there is a high 
concentration of prior belief about the point null. 
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b) Bayesian posterior probabilities of interval null hypotheses are quite 
close to P-values when the prior probability of H0 is reasonably small. 
B & D show that the Bayesian measures of evidence are about the same if one 
tests H0 :le-eol ~E. or if one tests H0 :e=e0 if E. is sufficiently small. In both cases 
the prior probability assigned to H0 is 710 • They say that this refutes the claim 
that the discrepancies between P-values and P(H0 lx) are caused by assignment of 
mass to a single point. But we do not believe that assignment of a large 
probability, say 710 = ~' to a tiny interval is much more realistic than assignment of 
1r 0 to the point e = e0 • In the above example, not only does the researcher typically 
not assign probability ~ to the hypothesis tJ.1 = tJ. 2 but also does not assign 
probability ~ to the interval jtJ. 1 -tJ.2 1 ~ E. where E. is small. The point is the same as 
above: The hypothesis tJ. 1 = IJ.z is of interest not because there is high prior 
probability concentrated about it but because of the interesting feature of the 
populations it describes. We see the B&D results mainly of interest to the 
Bayesian hypothesis tester who assigns probability 710 to H0 :le-60 l ~E. and who can 
simplify his calculations by approximating this problem with the problem in which 
probability 71 0 is assigned to the point null e=e0 • To see how small this interval 
must be for the approximation to be valid, note that if n = 25 and E.*= .4 (a medium 
value from Table 3 of B & D) then E. must be less than .08a. 
If the Bayesian assigns prior probability 710 to H0 :le-eol ~ Eo then Eo should 
not (indeed, cannot) depend on n, the sample size. We believe the relevant 
calculation in this case is the one done by B&D in Section 2.3 where they show 
that P(H0 lxn) --+ex. as n --+ oo where the P-value associated with Xn is ex.. So the 
Bayesian can use the P-value as an approximate posterior probability for large n, 
regardless of the value of 7r 0 • 
In the typical case in which the prior probability assigned to H0 :!e-eol ~ E. is 
small, this hypothesis may still be of interest. It says that the population is 
"close" to having the unique feature associated with e = e0 • But in this case the 
-6-
P-value and P(H0 I x) do not display the wide discrepancies that occur when the 
prior probability assigned to H0 is large. Consider the following comparison of 
P-values and PCiel ~ E.ix), which can be thought of as an amendment to Table 2 of 
B&D. Here, E.* is taken from Table 2 of B&D, and the probabilities are calculated 
according to Xle- n(e,1), e - n(0,22). 
Table 1: Comparison of P-values and P(lel < E.ix) 
X 1.645 1.96 2.576 2.807 3.29 3.89 
P-value .10 .OS .01 .005 .001 .0001 
E.= E.* .257 .221 .173 .160 .138 .117 
PCiei~E.jx) .079 .043 .011 .006 .002 .0003 
Table 1 shows that the Bayesian interval measure is quite close to the 
P-value, which supports our point (b). In Table 1, E.= E.* was just chosen as a 
typical small interval. In fact, for a range of values of E., and a range of values of 
x, this phenomenon persists. The P-value and P(lel < E.jx) are relatively close 
together, while P(e = 0 lx) is far from both of them. This is illustrated in the 
following Figure 1. 
The combination of our belief that the testing of a point null or a small 
interval null does not usually imply a high prior probability concentrated at H0 
and our numerical calculations to support our point (b), lead us to conclude that 
the fault is not with the P-value, but with the Bayesian point-mass calculation. 
The agreement between P-values and interval null probabilities is not restricted to 
the normal case, but also occurs in the binomial case. Consider Table 2, an 
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Figure 1: For Xl9 ~ n(9,1), P-value is the two-sided P-value. P(9=0lx) 
is calculated using a point mass of ~ at 9 = 0, and n(O, 22 ) prior 
elsewhere. P(I9I~E:Ix) uses only the n(0,22 ) prior, and is shown 
for E: = .1, .2, .3, .4, .5. The curves are increasing in E:. 
amendment to Table 7 of B&D. In Table 2, Xl9 ~binomial (n,9), and the first five 
columns are the same as B&D's Table 7. The interval posterior probability is 
calculated using a Beta {c90 ,c(l-90 )] prior, with c = 5. The value of E: was .OS. 
In summary, we have, at the very least, demonstrated that there exist 
legitimate criticisms of the Bayesian point null calculations, and dismissing P-values 
based on a lack of agreement with the point null calculations is unjustified. 
Moreover, there is agreement between P-values and Bayesian interval null 
calculations in the more typical situation in which small prior probability is 
assigned to H0 • So the very argument that B & D use to dismiss P-values can be 
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Table 2: Interval Posterior Probabilities for the Binomial 
a n X flo ~c P<l9-90l ~ Eix) 
.0090 50 11 .40 .0981 .030 
.0100 20 9 .20 .1771 .053 
.0101 20 14 .40 .1064 .025 
.0118 20 4 .50 .08S8 .021 
.0120 45 10 .10 .2211 .14S 
.0493 so 16 .20 .3313 .170 
.osos 1S 1 .30 .1956 .055 
.0507 25 3 .30 .2414 .069 
.OS41 40 10 .40 .3016 .102 
.OSS6 15 4 .10 .4223 .214 
.0960 1S 6 .20 .4123 .159 
.0980 25 5 .10 .4779 .341 
.0987 30 20 .so .3S65 .117 
.1000 35 1S .30 .4328 .200 
.1011 10 7 .40 .3458 .095 
.1094 10 2 .so .3163 .084 
turned around to argue for P-values. The recommendation of B & D, that "formal 
use of P-values should be abandoned," (Section S) is based on a faulty premise, the 
premise that the Bayesian point null calculation with large 110 is infallible and 
appropriate in all point null testing problems. Since this is far from the case, the 
use of P-values should not be abandoned. 
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